University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

3-29-1968

China: Retrospect and Prospect (publication)
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "China: Retrospect and Prospect (publication)" (1968). Mike Mansfield
Speeches, Statements and Interviews. 707.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/707

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Born in 1903, Mike Mansfield had,
by the age of 19, become a veteran
of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army and
the U.S. Marine Corps. By age 20 he
was a miner in Butte; by 27, a mining
engineer; by 30, a Professor of History at Montana State University,
where he holds permanent tenure.
Elected initially to the Congress in
1942, he served five terms in the
House of Representatives. Elected to
the Senate in 1952 he is presently
serving his third term in that body,
whose Majority Leader he has been
since 1961.
Senator Mansfield's interest in foreign policy is virtually lifelong. In
1951 he was appointed by President
Truman as a Delegate to the UN
Sixth Session in Paris. He was Presidential Delegate to the Southeast Asia

Conference in Manila in 1954. President Eisenhower appointed him U.S.
Delegate to the UN 13th General
Assembly. In 1962 he undertook an
extensive foreign policy assignment
for President Kennedy in West Berlin, Southeast Asia and Vietnam, and
a similar assignment for President
Johnson in 1965.. A member of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Mansfield is
also Chairman of the Democratic Conference, Policy Committee and Steering Committee.

Senator
Mike
Mansfield

In the lecture here reprinted, Senator
Mansfield has deepened our obligation to him, already profound, for
the clarity, temperance and soundness
with which he has analyzed our country's mo t formidable foreign policy
problem. The U AW's Twentieth Constitutional Convention declared, with
respect to Sino-American relations,
that "The ultimate goal is not victory
O\'er a human enemy but rather victory over the scourges of poverty,
hunger, ignorance and disease which
affiict the people of Southeast Asia."
After commending the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee for the invalu-

V1ctor G. R euther) Director)
UA TV lntenwtional Affairs Department

able service it had rendered in focusing public attention on a cou ntry so
little known but so vi tal to the future
of world peace as China, that Convention added that "however enigmatic and belligerent Red China may
be, the U. S. must reappraise its position toward that vast country." Mike
Man field, in the analysis which you
a re about to read, has explained why
more coge ntl y, more persuasively, than
any public figure in this country who
has yet spoken out on the China que tion. The UAW is grateful to the
Uni\'ersil) of Montana Foundation
both for its sponsorship of the lecture
originall) and for permission to reprint it.

Viet 1'\am i~ heavy on the heart of
the nation. The Vietnamese war is a
tragedy. It is a tragedy in the American li\es which it claims. It is a
tragedy in the death and de,·astation
which, in the name of sah-ation, it
has spread throughout Viet :\'am.
My views on United States policy
respecting Viet !'\am are no secret. I
ha\'e stated them, re~tated them, and
elaborated them many times. I ha\'e
cautioned again t an e'er-deepening
military i m oh ement in that conflict.
I am opposed to any increase in it
today. I belie\e that the way out of a
barbarous situation i~ not to go further into it.

,\., a nation, we h<ne lived thJOugh
a generation in onl) heana) association with a third of the enti1 e human
race ..-\t the inception of this \Oid, we
were engaged in a costl) indecisi'e
conflict in Korea-on China's nonhea'>t fr ontie1. Two decades later, we
are engaged once again in a costly
and indecisi' e conflict, this time on
China\ southeast fromier. These two
two great militar) imohements on
the Chine'>e periphery a1e not unrelated to the ab.,ence of rele' am contact between China and the United
~ta tes.
Sooner or later a tenuouo, truce rna)
be achie,ed in \'iet :\'am e'en as a
truce was achic,cd in Korea. In my
judgment , howe,cr, there will be no
du1able peace in Korea, Viet :\'am,
or amwhere che in .\sia unless thc1e
is a candid confrontation with the
problems of the Sino-U. S. relation.,hip.

s•ep One
The first ~tep towards peace, in my
judgment, is to concentrate and consolidate the U. S. military effort and
to escalate the peace-effort, looking
towards the negotiation of an honorable end of the conflict.
That, in brief, is the way I feel
•C:
about Viet :\'am. That is the way I China need'> peace if the potentials
ha\e felt about it for a long time. The of ir.. culture a1e to be rcalited. This
President knows it. The Senate knows nation need.., peace for the '>ame Jeait. ~fontana knows it.
'>011. In thi., cia\ and age, the world
\\"hat I ha'e to sa) to )OU, today, need., peace for c i' ilited '>UI i' a!. You
touche~ only indirectly on \'iet :\am.
~oung people h;ne the greatest '>take
\Iy remarko, a1e intended to go be- rn peace. For that 1cason, I a<,k \OU
)Ond Viet :\'am to what ma\ well be to look be,ond \ ' ict '\am. behind
the root~ of the war. In this first
lecture of the series on international
affairs, I wi')h to address \OUr attention to what is the great 'oid in the
foreign relations of thi'> nation-to
the question of China.
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Korea, to what may well be the core
of the failure of peace in Asia-to the
U. S.-Chinese estrangement of two
decades.
In 1784, Robert Morris, a signer
of the Declaration of Independence,
sent the first American clipper ship
to trade with China. The year that
President George Washington took
the oath of office, 1789, fourteen
American ships were riding at anchor
in the Pearl River off Canton in South
China.
There are no American ships in
Chinese ports today. There have not
been for almost twenty years. In
twenty years, hardly an American
doctor, scientist, businessman, journalist, student, or even a tourist has
set foot in China.
How We See Each Other
Across the Pacific Ocean, we and
the Chinese glare at one another, uncomprehendingly, apprehensively, and

suspiciously. In the United States,
there is fear of the sudden march of
Chinese armies into Southeast Asia.
In China, there is fear of a tighter
American encirclement and American
nuclear attack.
We see millions of Chinese soldiers
poised on China's frontiers. We see
leaders who threaten in a most violent
way. We see an internal Chinese turmoil to confirm our fears of irrationality and recklessness. Finally, we see
a growing nuclear power, with the
looming spectre of a full-fledged
Chinese
intercontinental
ballistic
missile force.
On the other hand, the Chinese
see themselves surrounded by massive
American military power. They see
U. S. naval, ground, and air bases
scattered through Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Okinawa, Guam, the Philippines, and Thailand. They see over
half a million American troops in
neighboring Viet Nam and hundreds
of thousands more nearby. They see
tremendous nuclear capability with
missiles zeroed in on Chinese cities.
They see the United States as
"occupying" the Chinese island of
Taiwan and supporting a Chinese
government whose declared aim is the
recapture of the mainland. And they
see, too, what they describe as a growing collusion between the United
States and the Soviet Union, a cuuntry
which they believe infringes China's
borders, threatens to corrupt the Chinese revolution and exercises an unwelcome influence throughout Asia.
We and the Chinese have not always looked at one another with such
baleful mistrust. The American images
of China have fluctuated and shifted
in an almost cyclical way. There has
been the image of the China of wisdom, intelligence, industry, piety, stoicism, and strength. This is the China
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of Marco Polo, Pearl Buck, Charlie
Chan, and heroic resistance to the
Japanese during \Vorld \Var II.
On the other hand, there has been
the image of the China of cruelty,
barbarism, violence, and faceless
hordes. This is the China of drumhead trials, summary executions, Fu
Manchu, and the Boxer Rebellionthe China that is summed up in the
phrase "yellow peril."

A: ·e n · :; •
Throughout our history, these two
images ha\e alternated, with first one
predominant and then the other. In
the eighteenth century, we looked up
to China as an ancient civilitationsuperior in many aspects of technology, culture, and social order and
surrounded by an air of splendid
mystery. Respect turned to contempt,
however, with China's quick defeat by
the British in the Opium War of
1840. There followed acts of humiliation of China such as participation in
extra-territorial treaty rights and the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
Attitudes shifted again in the
early twentieth century to one of benevolence largely in consequence of
the influence of missionaries. There
were more missionaries in China from
"the United States than from any
other country. .More American missionaries served in China than anywhere else in the world. The Chinese

became, for this nation, a guided,
guarded, and adored people.
Chinese resistance to the Japanese
invasion in 1937 produced another
shift from benevolence to admiration.
At the end of the Second \\'orld \Var,
admiration was displaced by disappointme nt and frustration, as the wartime truce between Nationalist and
Communist forces collapsed in cataclysmic internal strife. This nation
became profoundly disenchanted with
China, a disenchantmem whid1 was
replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostility.
The hostilit) was largel) a reaction,
of course, to the coming to powe1 of
a Communist regime on the Chinese
mainland. \\'e did not interpret this
event as a consequence of the massi'e
difficulties and the , ·ast inne1 weaknesses of a \\'aJ-torn China. Rather, we
.,aw it almost as an aflront to this nation. \Ve saw it as a treacherous extension of the So\ iet steam-roller policies
which had 1educed Ea., tel n and Cenual Emope to subsenience at the
end of World \\'a1 II.
Then, in 1918, came a Communist
coup in CtedlOsloYak.ia and the So\ iet
attempt to blockade Bellin. Ihe ll iumph of a Communist gcnernment in
China followed immediately afte1
the~e C\Cnts in Europe. The nation
was '>hak.en to its finge1 tips.
Still, the press of e\Cnts continued
relentle.!>sl). In June 1950, the ~cnth
Koreans launched a sudden attack on
South Korea. The Chinese forces intenened in the war in :'\0\embeJ of
that )Car. The United States was
brought into a major milita1) confrontation in which, fo1 the fnst time,
the Chinese were enemies and not
allies.
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.\fter these events, the assumptions of
.\merican policy towards China were
revised. An eiT01t was made to meet
both the concern and outrage respecting China which existed in this nation and the revolutiona1} militancy
of the new Chinese 1egime in Asia.
Policy was cast anew on the premise
that the government on the Chinese
mainland was an aggressor which, subject to directions from ;\lose ow, would
usc force to impose international Communism on .\ sia. ComeJsCl), it was
assumed that if the endorsement of
the f1 ee nation-. '''C I e withheld, this
re{{ime whi ch was -.aid to be "alien"
to the Chinese people '>Ome sort of
0\ er-grown puppet of :\foscow-wo uld
wither and e\el1lually collapse.
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On this basis, recognition was not
extended to Peking. The official view
was that the National Government,
which had 1etreated to the island of
Taiwan, continued to speak for all of
China. \Ve cut all trade with the
mainland and did what could be done
to encourage other countries to follow
suit. In a similar fashion, we led a
diplomatic campaign year after year
against the seating of the Chinese
People's Republic in the United Nations. \Ve drew an ar<. of military
alliances on the ~eaward side of China
and undergirded them with the deployment of massive American military power in bases throughout the
\Vestern Pacific.
Much has happened to call into
question the assumptions in which
these policies towards China have
been rooted. In the first place, the
People's Republic has shown itself to
be neither a part of a Communist
monolith nor a carbon copy of Soviet
Russia. The fact is that, of the numerous divi~ions which have arisen
within the Communist world, the
differences between Moscow and Peking h;l\e been the most significant.
They 'iO 1emain today although the
more rasping edges of the conflict appear somewhat tempered by the war
in VietNam.
At the same time, the government
on the mainland has not only sur'ived, it has provided China with a
functioning leadership. Under its di-

rection, Chinese society has achieved
a degree of economic and scientific
progress, apparently sufficient for survival of an enormous and growing
population and sophisticated enough
to produce thermo-nuclear explo-.ions.

Revolution Within Revolution
In the last two years, the so-called
Cultural R evolution in China h as rekindled what has been a periodic expectation that the Peking government
is on the verge of collapse and the
way i-. open for a military return to
the mainland of the National Government on Taiwan. There seems to be
little doubt that the turmoil in China
has camed serious di'>ruptions. vVhat
appears in conflict in the cultural
revolution, however, is not the Peking
<,tructure as such but the adequacy of
its ideological content. That would
be a far cry from the kind of popular
revolution which might be expected
to open the doors to a new regime.
In any event, the worst of the upheavals within China appear to have
ended months ago, without any irreparable break in the continuity of
the government or the operations of
the economy. It is the height of folly
to envision, in the present situation,
an occasion for the overthrow of the
Peking government by external military pressures. Indeed, what would be
better calculated to end, o,·ernight,
the remaining ferment on the mainland than a plausible threat to the
security of China or an actual attack
on Chinese territory?
China: Aggressive?
If the People's Republic, then, is
here to stay, what of the other assumption on which this nation's policy

respecting China has long been based?
What of the assumption that the
Chinese government is an expanding
and aggressive force? That it is restrained from sweeping through Asia
because we have elected to meet its
challenge along the 17th Parallel
which divides the Northern and
Southern parts of Viet Nam?
In recent years, the present Chinese
government has not shown any great
eagerness to use force to spread its
ideology elsewhere in Asia although
Chinese armies have been employed
in assertion of the traditional borders
of China. To be sure, China has given
enthusiastic encouragement and has
promised to support wars of national
liberation. However, China has not
participated directly in these wars
and support, when it has been forthcoming, has been limited and circumspect.
In Viet Nam, for example, there is
certainly Chinese encouragement and
aid for the North Vietnamese and the
VietCong. Chinese involvement, however, has been far more peripheral
than our own. The enemy soldiers
with whom we are compelled to
grapple are all Vietnamese and, in
fact, most South Vietnamese. At every
stage of the war, the assistance we
have provided to South VietNam has
far exceeded the aid from China and
from all outside sources to the Viet
Cong and North Viet Nam- both in
terms of men and materiel. There is
Chinese equipment in South VietNam
but there are no Chinese battalions.
Even in North Viet Nam, Chinese
manpower is reported to amount, at
most, to one-tenth of our forces in
Viet Nam, and the great bulk of these
Chinese are labor troops, some involved in air-defense but most of

them engaged in repamng bomb
damage to roads, railroads, bridges,
and the like.
Chinese actions in Tibet, and along
the Himalayan frontier of India, are
often cited as evidence of militant
Chinese Communist aggression. The
fact is, however, that Tibet has been
regarded, for many decades, as falling
within China's over-all boundaries.
Not only the Peking government but
also the Chinese National Government on Taiwan insists that Tibet
belongs to China. India also acknowledges such to be the case. Indeed,
American policy has never recognized
Tibet as other than Chinese territory.
In the case of the border war with
India in 1962, the Chinese Communists occupied territories which, again,
not only they, but also the Chinese
Nationalists, consider to be Chinese.
It is precisely characteristic of a militant expansionism, moreover, for a
government to withdraw its military
forces from a territory which they
have invested. Yet, the Peking government did so from parts of India which
were occupied in 1962 as well as from
North Korea.

No Economic Subversion Either
As for indirect aggression through
economic means, China has been able
to exert only a liimted influence,
either through aid or trade. In Africa
and, indeed, in Southeast Asia, where
attempts have been made to use trade
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and aid for political ends, the results
have been conspicuously successful.
The fact is that most of China's trade
today rests on a commercial-economic
base. It is carried on largely with the
non-Communist countries, including,
may I add, many of our closest allies.
In short, to speak of China, today,
as aggressively expansionist is to respond to Chinese words rather than
Chinese actions. That is not to say
that China will not pose all manner
of threats tomorrow. If there are not
enough nightmares already, consider
the prospects when China's nuclear
capabilities will have been extensively
developed, along with a full-fledged
intercontinental missile force.
Of course, there is an immense potential danger in China; but; there is
also an immense potential danger in
every other powerful nation in a
world which has not yet learned how
to maintain civilized survival in a
nuclear age except on the ra70r's edge.
Insofar as China is concerned, the
fundamental question for us is not
whether it is a danger, real or potential. The fundam ental question is
whether our present policies act to
alleviate or to exacerbate the danger.
Do we forestall the danger by jousting
with the shadows and suspicions of the
past? Do we help by a continuance
in policies which do little if anything
to lift the heavy curtain of mutual
ignorance and hostility?

Reconcilia on The :eps
Like it or not, the present Chinese
government is here to stay. Like it or
not, China is a major power in Asia
and is on the way to becoming a
nuclear power. Is it, therefore, in this
nation's interest and in th e interest of
world peace to put aside, once and for
all, what have been the persistent but
futile attempts to isolate China? Is it,
therefore, in this nation's interest and

m the interest of world peace to try
conscientiously and consistently to do
whatever we can do--and, admittedly,
it is not much-to reshape the relationship with the Chinese along more
constructive and stable lines? In short,
is it propitious for this nation to try
to do what, in fact, the policies of
most of the other Western democracies have already long since done regarding their Chinese relationships?
I must say that the deepening of
the conflict in Viet Nam makes more
difficult adjustments in policies respecting China. Indeed, the present
course of events in Viet Nam almost
insures that there shall be no changes.
It is not easy to contemplate an alleviation with any nation which cheers on
those who are engaged in inflicting
casualties on Americans. Yet, it may
well be that this allevi~tion is an
essential aspect of ending the war and,
hence, America n casualties. That consideration, alone, it seems to me,
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makes desirable initiatives towards matter, to admit Americans on any
basis.
China at this time.
There are several obvious areas in
In any event, it seems to me that it
which these initiatives would have is in the positive interest of this narelevance. Discriminatory restriction tion to encourage Americans, if they
on travel to China, for example, is can gain entry, to travel to China.
certainly one of these areas. The May I add, I refer not merely to the
Chinese may or may not admit Ameri- travel of selected journalists, doctors,
cans to their country, as they choose. and other specialists, as is now the
But it is difficult to understand why policy, but to the travel of any reour own government should in any sponsible American. In the same
way, shape, or form seek to stand in fashion, it seems to me most approthe way of the attempts of American priate to admit Chinese travelers to
citizens to breech the great wall of the United States under the same conestrangement between the two na- ditions that pertain to visitors from
tions. It is, indeed, ironic that during other Communist countries.
the past three years there have been Trade
more visits of Americans to North Trade is another area in which longViet Nam, a nation with which we are standing policies respecting China are
at war, than to China in the past open to serious question. Technically,
thirteen years.
this country still maintains an embargo on all trade with China. The
Travel
On the question of travel, it should basis for this policy is compliance
be recalled that the Chinese were the with a voluntary resolution of the
first to suggest in 1956 that American United Nations which was adopted at
journalists visit China. The suggestion our behest at the time of the Korean
was summarily rejected by the then conflict. It is doubtful that the resoluSecretary of State. W'hen, later, it was tion ever carried much weight among
decided to accept the suggestion, the the trading nations of the world. In
Chinese had changed their minds. any case, it has long since been forSince that time, this nation has been gotten. Today, the principal nations
more inclined to ease the travel bar- in the China trade in rough order of
riers, on the basis of official agreement importance are the United Kingdom,
for exchanges of persons, but the Japan, the Soviet Union, West GerChinese have shown no disposition to many, Australia, Canada, Italy, and
enter into agreements or, for that France. Of all the great maritime nations, the United States alone clings
to a total trade embargo with China.
Moreover, we are also the only nation
in the world which makes an effort to
enforce what can best be described as
a kind of secondary boycott of reexported Chinese products.
These policies have had little visible economic impact, but they have
had the most serious political repercussions. It is conceivable that, to the
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Chinese, the policies are something
of an irritant. To friendly nations,
however, they have been a source of
constant friction. Most serious, their
continuance over the years has injected unnecessary venom into the atmosphere of U. S.-Chinese relations.
Nor can it be said that the situation
in Viet Nam has compelled the pursuit of the embargo and boycott. The
fact is that these restrictions were in
place before most Americans ever
heard of Viet Nam, and, certainly,
long before Americans became involved in the war. If the Vietnamese
conflict i now seen as justification for
leaving these policies undi turbed,
what is to be said of the existing attitude toward trade with other Communist countries?
The fact is that the European Communists are providing North Viet
Nam and the Viet Cong with sophisticated military equipment which,
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from all reports, exceeds in value the
assistance which comes from China.
On what basis, then, is it meaningful
to permit and even to encourage nonstrategic trade with the European
Communist countries while holding
to a closed-door policy on trade with
China? What constructive purpose is
served by the distinction? Any rationalization of relations with China, it
seems to me, will require an ad justment of this dual approach. We need
to move in the direction of equal
treatment of all Communist nations
in trade matters, whatever that treatment may be.
In any event, problems of travel
and trade are secondary obstacles in
the development of a more stable relationship between China and the
United States. There are other far
more significant difficulties. I refer,
principally, to the question of Taiwan
and to the war in Viet N am.
Vietnam: Roadblock to Peace
There is no doubt that the Chinese
government seeks in Viet Nam a government which is friendly, if not subservient. Peking has not concealed,
moreover, its desire for the withdrawal of American military power
from Southeast Asia. It does not follow, however, that the price of peace
in Southeast Asia is either Chinese
domination or U. S. military intervention. That is a black and white oversimplification of a gray situation. The
fact is that neither Burma on China's
border nor Cambodia have been "enslaved" by China, despite an association of many years, despite periodic
difficulties with the great state to the
north and despite an absence of U. S.
support, aid, or protection. These two
nations have managed to survive in a
state of detachment from the power

rivalries of the region. Furthermore,
China is a signatory to the settlements
which emerged from the Geneva Conferences of I 954 and 1962 and which
contain at least a hope for a middle
way to peace in Indo-China. So far as
I am aware, the Chinese have not
been found in direct or unilateral
violation of these agreements. It is not
impossible that a similar settlement,
with Chinese participation, might be
reached on VietNam.
Indeed, it is to be devoutly hoped
that there can be a solution along
these lines. Unless it is found, there is
a very real danger-as the Korean experience shows-that the prolongation
of war on China's frontiers may well
bring about another U. S.-Chinese
armed confrontation.
Th T o China Pr blem
Perhaps the most important element
in the rebuilding of stable relations
with China is to be found in a solution of the problem of Taiwan. It
may help to come to grips with this
issue, if it is understood at the outset
that the island of Taiwan is Chinese.
That is the position of the National
Government of the Republic of
China. That is the position of the
People's Republic of China. For a
quarter of a century, this common
Chinese position has been reinforced
by the policies and actions of the
United States government.
Since that is the case, I do not believe that a solution to the Taiwan
question is fa cilitated by its statement
in terms of a two-China policy, as has
been suggested in some quarters in
recent years. The fact is that there is
one China which happens to ha'.e
been divided into two parts by events
which occurred a long time ago. Key
factors in the maintenance of peace
between the separate segments have
been the interposition of U. S. military power in the Taiwan straits, and

the strengthening of the National
Government of China by massive injections of economic and military aid.
This course was followed by the
United States for many reasons, not
the least of which was that it made
possible a refuge for dedicated allies
and associates in the war against
Japan. 1\Iost of all, however, it was
followed because to have permitted
the closing of the breech by a military
clash of the two opposing Chinese
forces would have meant a massive
bloodbath and, in the end, the rekindling of another great war in Asia.
Ca .

"

"·.
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However, the situation has changed in
the \Vestern Pacific. Taiwan is no
longer abjectly dependent for its survival on the United States. Some of
the passions of the deep Chinese political division have cooled with the
passing of time . .\nother generation
has appeared and new Chinese societies, in effect, have grown up on
both sides of the Taiwan ~traits.
Is there not, then, ~ome better way
to confront this problem than threatand-counter-threat between island
Chinese and mainland Chinese? Is
there not some better way to li' e with
this situation than by the armed truce
which depends, in the last analysis,
on the continued presence of the U. S.
7th Fleet in the Taiwan Straits?
The questions cannot be answered
until all involved a1e prepared to take
a fresh look at the situation. It seems
to me that it might be helpful if there
could be, among the Chinese themselves, an examination of the possibilities of improving the climate. As I
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have already indicated, the proper
framework for any such consideration
would be an acceptance of the contention of both Chinese groups- that
there is only one China and Taiwan
is a part of it. In that context, the
questions at issue have to do with the
dichotomous situation as between
mainland and island governments and
the possibility of bringing about constructive changes therein by peaceful
means.
There is no cause to be sanguine
about the prospects of an approach
of this kind. One can only hope that
time may have helped to ripen the
circumstances for settlement. It is
apparent, for example, that the concept \•:hich held the Chinese government on Taiwan to be the sole hope
of China's redemption has gmwn less
re]e, ant with the years. For Taiwan,
therefore, to remain i-.olated from the
mainland is to court the risk that the
island will be left once again, as it has
been on other occasions, in the backwash of Chinese history.
The remo' al of the wedge of separation, morem cr. would also seem to
accord with the intere-.h of the mainland Chinese gO\ emmcnt. It doe.'>
have a legitimate concem in the rcas.,enion of the historic connection of
Taiwan and China. It docs h <n c a
concern in ending the ho-.tile di,ision
which has been wql) and disruptive
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both within China and in China's
in tern a tiona) rei a tionshi ps.
From the point of view of the
United States, too, there is an interest
in seeking a less tenuous situation.
Progress in settling the Taiwan question could contribute to a general
relaxation of tensions in the Western
Pacific and, conceivably, even to resolution of the conflict in Viet Nam.
Certainly, it would make possible a
reduction in the enormous and costly
over-all defense burdens which were
assumed in Asian waters after World
War II and which, two decades later,
still rest on the shoulders of this
nation.

The Summation
To sum up, then, it seems to me that
the basic adjustment which is needed
in policies respecting China is to make
crystal clear that this government does
not anticipate, much less does it seek,
the overthrow of the government of
the Chinese mainland. In addition,
there is a need to end the discrimination which consigns China to an inferior status as among the Communist
countries in this nation's policies respecting travel and trade. Finally, it
ought to be made unequivocal that
we are prepared at all times to meet
with Chinese representatives-formally or informally-in order to consider differences between China and
the United States over Viet Nam or
any other question of common concern.
Adjustments of this kind in the
policies of the nation, it seems to me,
require above all else a fresh perspective. We need to see the situation in
Asia as it is today, not as it appeared
twenty years ago in the Himalayan
upheaval of the Chinese revolution.
We need to see the situation not
through the fog of an old and stagnant hostility but in the light of the
enduring interests of the United
States in the Western Pacific.
In this context we will better be
able to find appropriate responses at
appropriate times to the specific problems of the Sino-U. S. relationship,
whether they have to do with U. N.
representation or diplomatic recognition or the off-shore islands or whatever. Without prior adjustment in
perspective, however, to seek to deal
definitivel y with these questions
would be, to say th e least, an exercise
in futility.
I should emphasite before concluding that it is unlikely that there will
be any eager Chinese responses to
initiatives on our part. Nevertheless,

I see nothing to be lost for this nation
in trying to move along the Ii nes
which have been suggested. Chinese
intransigence is no license for American intransigence. Our stake in the
situation in the 'Vestern Pacific is too
large for that sort of infantile indulgence.

A Time For Deep Thought
I see great rele\ a nee in thinking
deeply of the issues which eli\ ide
China and the l.lnited States to see
if the) can be recast in new and uncluttered molds. There is e\ er) reason, especial!) for ;oung people, to
examine most close!) the premises of
poliC) regarding China which were
enshrined almost t\\"O decade~ ago.
The fact is that the breakdown in
Chinese-U.S. relatiom was one of the
great failures of 111) gene1 at ion and
it is high!) doubtful that its full repair shall be seen in m; liletime. The
problem, therefore, will fall huge!) to
)OU. It is not a partie ula1l) happ)
inheritance, but there is 1cason LO
hope that Jt ma\ fare better in )OUJ
hands.

Unlike ll1) generation, )OU know
about Asia. You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation
and to the world. In l9cJ2, (our
months after Pearl ll arbor, for example, an opinion poll found that
sixty percent of a national sample of
Americans still could not locate either
China or India on an outline map
of the world. Certain]) that would not
be the case toda). Furthermore, )OU
ha,·e not had the experience of national trauma in moving abruptly
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from an era marked by an almost
fawning benevolence toward China
to one of thorough disenchantment.
You were spared the fierce hostilities
which rent this nation internall), as
a sense of warmth, sympathy, and
security regarding China ga\e way to
feelings of rendsion, hatred, and insecurity.
Your Chinese counterparts, the
young people of today's China-they
are called the "Heirs of the Revolution"-have a similar gap to bridge
as they look across the Pacific. Your
generation in China, too, has been
contained and isolated, and its view
of the United States has been colored
with the hates of another time. It has
had no contact with you or, indeed,
with much of the world outside
China.
On the other hand, those )Oung
people have grown up under easier
conditions than the older generation
of Chinese who lived their youth in
years of continuous war and revolution. It may be that thC) can face
you and the rest of the wotld with
greater equanamity and assurance
than has been the case at an) time in
modern Chinese history.
New Hands Needed
I urge you to think for yourselves
about China. I urge you to approach,
with a new objectivity, that nst nation, with its great population of
industrious and intelligent people.
Bear in mind that the peace of Asia
and the world will depend on China
as much as it does on this nation, the
Soviet Union, or an) other, not because China is Communist but because China is China-among the
largest countries in the world and the
most populous.

Mao Tse-Tung remarked in an interview several years ago that "future
events would be decided by future
generations." Insofar as his words involve the relationship of this nation
and China, whether they prove to be
a prophecy of doom or a forecast of a
happier future will depend not so
much on us, the "Old China Hands"
of yesterday, but on you, the "New
American Hands" of tomorrow.
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